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Abstract
While there is general agreement about the direction of a tiered
stock market, little is known about the effects of it on the companies
and stocks involved. This paper contains an analysis of the companies
and the common stock in one of those tiers based upon market value. The
analysis considers trading activity, stock price volatility, dividend
payout, and financing characteristics (debt/equity ratios). The results
clearly document some significant changes during the fifteen year period
1964-1978. Specifically, it appears that the lower tier firms have
experienced a decline in relative market liquidity and dividend payout,
while experiencing an increase in stock price volatility and financial
leverage.

AK ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF A MULTI-TIEKED STOCK MAKKEl
nsTRODUCTIOK
A great deal has been written about the existence of a nnilti-tiered
stock market, while little is known about the effects of such a market.
It is generally acknowledged that a tiered market v^as formed in the
early 1970 's as a result of the growth in relative tracing by major fi-
nancial institutions (Armour [3], Blume [8], Elia [16,17,18,19,20,21,22],
Freund [25], Farrar [23], Klemkosky [29,30], Loomis [32], Robbins [A7],
Rosenberg [48], Seligman [52], Smidt [55], Soldofsky [56], West and
Tinic [67], and Schultz [50]). More recent discussions have considered
the current nature of the tiered market (Welles [65,66], Carson-
Parker [11], Ang [1], Marcial [36,37,38], Lurie [34], Janeway [27],
Buhl [10], Loomis [33]). While changes may have occurred, we believe
a tiered market exists and will continue to influence trading and
relative pricing (Elia [17,18,19], Marcial [37,38], Reilly [45]).
Because a multi-tiered stock market will probably continue, it becomes
important to determine the effects of the tiered market on the securities
and firms involved. Specifically, this paper examines common stocks
in one of three market tiers (based on various measures of size) , in
terms of trading activity, price volatility, and financing characteristics
during the 15 year period 1964-1978. The total period is divided
into three subperiods representing periods of increasing trading activity
by institutional investors. Specifically the first period is generally
prior to the institutional impact, the second is a transitional period,
and the recent period is when institutions have become the dominant
trading group.
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The initial section contains a discussion of what constitutes a
multi-tiered market and the general effects expected. Section two con-
siders the data employed and discusses the alternative tests. The re-
sults are presented and discussed in section three. The concluding
section summarizes the results and discusses the implications for
financial analysts and financial managers.
A TIERED MARKET
The multi-tiered stock market has developed because of the increase
in equity trading by large financial institutions such as mutual funds,
bank trust departments, pension funds and insurance companies. Insti-
tutional trading began to grow around 1965 and has continued to grow to
the present. The period 1969-1973, witnessed an acceleration in the
growth rate of institutional trading (See Klemkosky [30] , Klemkosky
and Scott [29], Reilly [A4,45], Smidt [55], and Soldofsky [56]).
The tiered market developed because of the grov^th in institutional
trading and the unique characteristics and needs of large institu-
tional investors with multi billion dollar portfolios. While the man-
agement of large portfolios is desirable because of the substantial
economies of scale in money management, it is important to miniirdze
the number of issues in a portfolio consistent with diversification
requirements to minimize research and administrative costs. Large
portfolios coupled with few issues means that each issue owned must
represent a large dollar holding.
Institutions also desire liquidity for their holdings—i.e., the
ability to quickly buy or sell a sizeable block of stock without a
substantial price change. A major influence on liquidity is the
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institut ion's position relative to the number of shares outstanding.
When a portfolio only contains a small percentage of the outstanding
issue it is possible to buy or sell additional shares without dis-
rupting the price. Consequently, because institutions need large
dollar amounts of each investment in their portfolio and also want
to hold a small percent of the outstanding shares, the total market
value of the shares of the firms in which institutions invest must
be substantial . As a result, institutions typically only consider
the shares of companies with large market values. An article by Reillj^
[45] contains an example of required size and suggested a breakdown
of the approximate number of companies in each of three tiers.
The top tier contained only companies large enough to be considered
by all institutions (i.e., an approximate market value of equity of
about $400 million) . The second tier included firms large enough to
be considered by medium-sized institutions (i.e., an estimated size of
at least $200 million). All remaining firms, which would include the
majority of firms, would constitute the bottom tier and they would
generally not be of interest to institutions because of the size re-
quirements postulated above,
EFFECTS OF A TIERED MARKET
There are two factors regarding a tiered market. First, there
typically are differences betv7een large and small firms aside from
the tiered market. Specifically, prior to the tiered market, one
would expect small firms to have less market liquidity and greater
stock price volatility than large firms. Our results should confirm
these relationships. More important, we believe that there have been
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differential changes ir. several important variables for large and
small firms because of the development of a tiered icarket .
Market Liquidity
External iDE.rket liquidity is the ability to buy or sell an asset
very quickly with little price change assuming no new information.
The stock of large firms should have greater market liquidity because
typically there are more shares outstanding, more stockholders, and
more trading in the shares. Therefore, we would expect an initial
difference in market liquidity for the firms in the top tier coirfiared
with the lower tier firms
.
Because of the tiered market, we would hj'pothesize an increase in
the differences in market liquidity between the firms in the top tier
and the firms in the other tiers. The increase in relative trading by
large financial institutions and their preference for the stock of
large firms should cause an increase in the market liquidity for the
large firms' and no change or possibly a decline in the liquidity of
stocks in the other tiers. Therefore, whatever the original differ-
ences in liquidity, we expect an increase in this difference in market
liquidity in the recent period compared with the early period .
Stock Price Volatility
One would expect an initial difference in the level of a stock price
volatility for large and small firms because larger firms have less sales
Several studies that analyzed factors that influence the rerket
spread of stocks (bid-ask spread) indicated a high correlation between
number of shares outstanding, the niunber of stockholders, and shares
traded. In this regard, see West and Tinic [68],
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and earnings volatility due to greater product diversification. Hepce,
they have less stock price volatility. In recent years, because smaller
firms have probably become less liquid, this would increase their stock
price volatility. Therefore, beyond the initial difference in stock
price volatility, vje hypothesize an increase in the differences in stock
price volatility because of the larger difference in market liquidity.
Earnings Multiple
In an earlier version of the paper we noted that one might expect
a relative decline in price-earnings ratios for the smaller firms
because of the increase in risk, IJe also noted that the higher risk
could be offset by higher growth expectations for the smaller firms. The
results basically confirmed the offset argximent—there was practically
no difference in the average p/e at the beginning or at the end for
the alternative samples. Therefore, due to space limitations these
results are not reported but are available from the authors.
Dividend Policv
Firms generally determine their capital structure based upon
their preference for financial risk which is influenced by the firms
business risk—i.e.. a firm with high business risk will generally
have relatively less financial risk. Therefore, because small firms
typically have higher business risk, one might expect that they woiild
have less financial risk. Recently, because of the decline in liquidity
for the stock of small firms, it would be difficult for these firms to
sell new issues in the primary market. This would cause an increase
in internal equity financing by smaller firms and a higher level of
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eamlngs retention . Because smaller firms have relatively more invest-
ment opportunities than larger firms and generally' fewer financing
alternatives we would expect them to have a higher level of retention
initially. Recently, since the tiered market has meant even fex-;er
available financing alternatives for small firms, we expect a larger
difference in internal financing—i.e., we hypothesize an increase in
the difference between the retention rates
.
Capital Structure
Finally we anticipate a change in the relative debt-equity mix.
Overall, there has been an increase in the relative proportion of debt
financing by U.S. corporations during the past two decades. In addi-
tion, because lower tier firms find it difficult to sell new equity in
the primary market, they may be forced to the debt market. Therefore,
we would expect a larger increase in the debt-equity ratio for small
firms than for larger firms .
TESTS OF EFFECTS
Changes in Market Liquidity
Although the concept of market liquidity is fairly well developed,
there are few measures of liquidity available. An alternative is to
examine variables that should influence a measure of liquidity. As
noted, the studies that have examined market makers spreads (i.e.,
the bid-ask spread) have indicated that one of the most important
variables influencing this measure of liquidity is trading volume .
Therefore, we examine the absolute and relative share trading volume
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for the alternative samples during the three periods. We also analyzed
relative trading as measured by the trading turnover for the stocks
involved (i.e., the number of shares traded divided by the nuniex of
shares outstanding)
.
""
Change in Stock Price Volatility
Three measures of stock price volatility are employed. The first
is the high-low spread during a month as a percent of the average of
the high and low. The second measure is the average standard devia-
tion of nonthly price changes. The third measure is the average beta
coefficient.
Changes in Di\d-dend Payout
The average payout for each of the groups during each of the
three periods was analyzed to determine the differences during each
period and any changes over time .
Changes in Capital Structure
Finally, we computed the average debt/equity ratio for each year
and examined the initial difference in the capital structure and deter-
mined whether the original relationship changed over time.
Data Set
Fifty stocks were chosen at random for each of the three tiers.
Total market value of outstanding shares was the principle size
variable used for placing a stock in a specific tier as suggested by
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Reilly [45]. The level of market value as of 1975 determined the spe-
cific tier. Using 1975 allowed the sample to be formulated subsequent
to the dominance of the institutional trading in the inarket vhile
avoiding potential biases of either the beginning or end of the study
period. While all 50 stocks vjere always available for the top tier,
some variability occurred within the samples for Tier 2 and 3 due to
data availability.
Stock data was collected froni the ISL books and the University of
Chicago CRSP tapes. Balance sheet and incoBie statement data came from
the Standard and Poor's Compustat tapes.
PP^ESEKTATIOK OF RESULTS
Market Value
As indicated, the stocks were divided into tiers on the basis of
market value as of 1975. Table 1 contains the average market value for
the samples for each year and a relative value compared to the average
market value per issue for all common stocks on the NYSE. The purpose
of this analysis is to indicate that the sample selection process gen-
erated firms that are significantly different in size and consistent with
the specification set forth in Reilly [A5].
Clearly, the sairiple companies differ substantially in size. A simple
pairwise difference test for the 15 years indicated tliat the firms in
tier 1 vjere significantly larger (at the .01 level) than the firms in
tier 2 (F ratio of 311.81) or tier 3 (F ratio of 325.59). Alternatively,
the firms in tier 2 were not significantly larger than the firms in
tier 3 although the average size was about three times larger.
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The companies were also consistent with the Reilly [45] specifi-
cation since the average top tier firm ranged over tiEie from about
$3 billion to $5 billion, the second tier ranged from about $200 ndllion
to $400 million, while the bottom tier ranged from about $45 ciillion to
$115 million.
In the analysis that follows V7e will exaiid.ne the differences between
tiers and changes over time using univariate analysis of variance to
answer three questions:
1. Is there a significant difference in the levels of the variables
between tiers—e.g., is there a significant difference in
the payout ratio for firms in tier 1 versus firms in tier 3?
We refer to this as the tier test.
2. Is there a significant change in the variable over time
within a tier—e.g., is there a significant change in the
debt-equity ratio over time in tier 1? We refer to this as
the time test.
3. Is there a significant difference in the change ir the variable
over time for two alternative tiers—e.g. j was the change in
systematic risk (beta) significantly different for tier 1
versus tier 2? VJe refer to this as the time-tier test.
Market Liquidity
We expected that initially the top tier stocks would be more
liquid and that during the test period, the difference in liquidity
would increase.
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TABLE 1
AVELsAGE MARKET VALUE OF OUTSTANDING
COMMON STOCKS FOR COI'lPAKIES IK ALTERN/.TIVE TIERS
ME RELATIVE TO TEE AVERAGE STOCK OK THE NYSE
/YEAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Ave. NYSE
($000) Relative ($000) Relative ($000) Relative ($000)
1964 3,534,698 11.97 220,050 .74 45,588 .15 295,344
1965 3,884,733 11.76 263,022 .80 55,959 .17 330,351
1966 3,276,936 11.31 232,964 .80 50,641 .18 289,834
1967 4,197,958 11.78 299,760 .84 83,720 .24 356,363
1968 4,409,454 11.25 357,981 .91 99,362 .25 391,815
1969 3,901,798 n.09 285,822 .81 79,578 .23 351,846
1970 4,009,023 11.59 276,397 .80 69,929 .20 345,859
1971 4,475,278 11.63 311,312 .81 88,245 .23 384,965
1972 5,318,664 12.22 335,231 ,77 99,478 .23 435,117
1973 4,385,074 12.52 259.920 .74 72,535 .21 350,346
1974 3,066,767 12.48 183,646 .75 48,757 .20 245,700
1975 4,171,896 12.86 294,543 .91 74,729 .23 324,543
1976 5,154,717 14.09 389,585 1.06 98,223 .27 365,934
19 77 4,503,370 12.01 361,555 .96 104,296 .28 374,994
1978 4,585,795 10.46 385,564 .88 115,145 .26 438,233
1964-68 3,860,756 11.60 274,755 .83 67,054 .20 332,737
1969-73 4,417,967 11.82 293,736 .79 81,953 .22 373,627
1974-78 4,296,509 12.28 322,978 .92 88,231 .25 349,881
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The share volume of trading variable clearly supported both expectations.
The results contained in Table 2 indicate a significant difference in the
initial trading volume and the change over time was likewise s ignificantly
different . Specifically, the average annual volume for top tier stocks
during the first five years was over 4.5 million shares compared to less
than 900 thousand for the bottom tier stocks—this represents a significant
difference. By the last five year period, the top tier stocks were averaging
over 15 million shares a year, compared to a little over 1 million shares
for the bottom tier stocks. Again, this represents a significant difference
in the change over time for the two tiers. The results relative to all issues
on the NYSE likewise show the expected trends. During the first five years,
the average top tier stock had about 3.3 times as much volume as the average
NYSE stock. By the end, this ratio was almost six times. In contrast, the
bottom tier stocks lost ground relative to the average stock—from 62 percent,
the relative volume declined steadily to 44 percent.
The initial trading turnover results in Table 3 were unexpected because
they indicated that the second and third tier stocks were experiencing much
higher turnover than the top tier stocks—about .25 versus .14. The ANOVA
tests indicated that there was a significant difference in turnover between
all three tiers at the .01 level. More important, the changes in the
turnover rates clearly supported our liquidity hypothesis. Specifically,
during this period the top tier stocks experienced a fairly consistent increase
in turnover, although it was not statistically significant. In contrast, the
bottom tier stocks experienced a consistent decline in trading turnover that
was statistically significant. The time-tier test confirmed the significant
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I^LE 2
AVERAGE ANNUAL SHAKE VCLUl-E FOR COMPANIES
IK ALTERl^'ATIVE TIERS AND RELATIVE TO
ALL ISSUES OK THE NYSE
YEAR Tier 1 Tiei 2 Tier 3 NYSE
Ave, Relative Ave, Relative Ave. Relative Ave.
(000) (000) (000) (000)
1964 3,586.7 3.89 1,070.0 1.16 465.3 .50 923.0
1965 3,623.4 3.26 1,615.9 1.45 584.6 .53 1,112.1
1966 4,423.3 3.34 1,941.7 1.47 669.5 .51 1,324,2
1967 5,065.3 2.98 2,602.7 1,53 1,282.1 .76 1,697.5
1968 6.242.9 3.34 2,587.6 1.39 1,320.3 .71 1,866.8
1969 7,474.9 4.21 2,033.2 1.15 955.4 .54 1,773.9
1970 8,048.7 4,61 1,939,0 1.11 992.3 .57 1,746.2
1971 9,530.1 4,31 2,978.6 1,35 1,214.3 .55 2,213.4
1972 9,707.5 4.32 3,209.9 1.43 1,310.0 ,58 2,244.7
1973 10,777.8 5.11 2,615.5 1.24 883.5 .42 2,107.2
1974 9,399.0 5.12 2,016.4 1.10 581.4 .32 1,837.5
1975 11,318.9 4.72 2,730,8 1.14 926.4 .39 2,400.0
1976 17,904.3 6.84 4,040,4 1.54 1,117.5 .43 2,617.8
1977 17,550o8 6.81 3,330,3 1.29 1,207.9 .47 2,578.5
1978 20,722.3 5.97 5,030.7 1.45 1,901.1 .55 3,472.2
1964-•68 4,588,3 3.31 1,963.6 1.42 864.4 .62 1,384,7
1969-73 9,107.8 4.52 2,555.2 1.27 1,071.1 .53 2,017.1
1974-78 15,379.1 5.96 3,429.7 1.33 1,146.9 .44 2,581.2
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE SHARE TRADIKG TURNO\'ER FOR COKPAls^IES
K ALTERNATIVE TIERS AND PiUi^TIVE TO AVERAGE
TURNOVER FOR ALL STOCKS ON THE NYSE
YEAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 NYSE
Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave.
1964 .142 1.01 .222 1.59 .271 1.94 .14
1965 .148 .93 .313 1.96 .323 2.02 .16
1966 cl93 1.07 .310 1.72 .394 2.19 .18
1967 .182 .83 .326 1.48 .579 2.63 .22
1968 .195 .81 .310 1.29 .727 3.03 .24
1969 .191 .96 .234 1.17 .341 1.70 .20
1970 .187 .98 .194 1.02 .275 1.45 .19
1971 .253 1.10 .277 1.20 .368 1.60 .23
1972 .181 .79 .268 1.17 .379 1.65 .23
1973 .198 .99 .228 1.14 .224 1.12 .20
19 7A .147 .92 .168 1.05 .141 .88 .16
1975 o216 1.03 .227 1.08 .247 1.18 .21
1976 .257 1.12 .287 1.25 .257 1.12 .23
1977 .233 1.11 .226 1.08 .262 1.25 .21
1978 .284 1.05 c317 1.17 .417 1.54 .27
196A-•68 .172 .91 c296 1.57 .459 2.44 .188
1969-73 .202 .96 .240 1.14 .317 1.51 .210
1974-78 .227 1.05 .245 1.13 .265 1.23 .216
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difference in change for tier 1 versus tier 3 and tier 2 versus tier 3.
Again, the relative results bear this out—the top tier stocks had a
consistent increase in the relative ratio (.91 to 1.05), while the bottom
tier stocks experienced a significant decline in the relative ratio
(2. 44 to 1.23).
In summary, these two indicators of market liquidity indicate a
much higher level of liquidity for the top tier stocks and also clearly
indicate that the difference in liquidity increased during this period
to the detriment of bottom tier stocks.
Price Volatility
Because we expected the lower tier stocks to experience reduced
market liquidity we hypothesized that their stock prices would become
more volatile. The first measure of price volatility used is the annual
range of prices during the year as a percent of the mid-ranges:
(H - L/H + L T 2)
.
The results in Table 4 indicate that lower tier stocks definitely
are more volatile than the stocks in the top tier . On average, the
tier 2 stocks are about 40 percent more volatile than the tier 1 stocks
and the bottom tier stocks are at least twice as volatile as tier 1
stocks (the difference between tier 1 and 3 was significant at the
.12 level). The results indicate that the stocks in all three tiers
and the aggregate market experienced an increase in volatility during
this period. This is consistent with the results in Wachowicz and
Reilly [64]. In terms of differential changes, the results indicate
that for the total period, the top tier stocks experienced a larger
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TABLE A
AVERAGE ANNUAL PRICE RANGE AS A PERCENT OF
MID-RANGE FOR COMPANIES IN ALTERNATIVE TIERS ANT)
RELATIVE TO PERCENl' RAl^GE FOR S+P400
YEAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 S+P400
Ave, Rel. Ave. Rel, Ave. Rel. Ave.
1964 .084 .62 .102 .76 .498 3.69 .135
1965 .104 .79 .209 1.59 .257 1.96 .131
1966 .176 .69 .300 1.18 .298 1.17 .254
1967 .138 .63 .182 .83 .382 1.75 .218
1968 .131 .61 .222 1.03 .281 1.30 .216
1969 .188 1.09 .221 1.28 .266 1.54 .173
1970 .331 1.08 .336 1.10 ,468 1.53 .306
1971 .193 1.26 .214 1.40 .327 2.14 .153
1972 .170 1.01 .171 1.01 .338 2.00 .169
1973 o247 .94 c414 1.58 .525 2.00 .262
1974 .374 .80 .349 .75 .445 .96 .465
1975 .270 .84 .362 1.13 .680 2.12 .321
1976 .214 1.24 .258 1.49 .512 2.96 .173
1977 .109 .63 ,192 1.10 .517 2.97 .174
1978 .237 1.10 .483 2.24 .600 2.78 .216
1964-68 .127 .66 .203 1.06 .343 1.80 .191
1969-73 .226 1.06 .271 1.27 .385 1.81 .23.3
1974-78 .241 .89 .329 1.22 .551 2.04 .270
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increase in volatility. In contrast, between the last two five year
periods (1969-73 vs. 197^-78), the stocks in tier 3 experienced the
largest increase follov7ed by tier 2 while the top tier had the smallest
increase (actually the relative volatility declined) . Notably, it is
during this period when the iristitutions became dominant. None cf the
changes over the 15 years were significant!}' different.
The second measure of price volatility is the average standard
deviation of monthly rates of returri during the three five year periods.
The results in Table 5 part A confinn that the tier 3 stocks are the
most volatileo The tier 3 stocks always had the largest standard
deviation but it was not significantly larger than the other tiers. In
addition, the average standard deviation for the stocks in tier 3
experienced the largest increas e in standard deviation over the three
periods but again, none of the increases viere significant. The increase
in tier 1 over time was greater than tier 2 at the 10 percent level but
no other comparisons were significant. All three groups had a higher
average standard deviation than the market portfolio, but all three
tiers experienced a decline in the relative ratio.
The third measure of volatility is the average beta coefficient
for the individual stocks relative to the Fisher NYSE Index. The
results in Table 5 part B show that there was a significant difference
in the average beta during the three periods. The difference between
tier 1 and 2 was significant at the .01 level while tier 1 and 3 and 2
and 3 were significant at the .10 level. Tb.e only tier that experienced
a significant change over time was tier 2. Finally, the change in beta
for tier 2 was significantly different than either tier 1 or tier 3.
The change in 1 versus 3 was not significant.
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TASLE 5
AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATION OF MONTHLY RATES OF
RETURN AND AVERAGE BETAS FOR COMPANIES IN
ALTERNATIVE TIERS AND RELATIVE TO A MARKET SERIES
1964-68 1.01
1969-73 1.06
1974-78 0.95
A. Average Standard Deviation
Market
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Series
Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave.
1964-68 6.26 2.03 7.88 2.55 8.95 2.90 3.09
1969-73 7.91 1.82 9.26 2.13 11.17 2.57 4.35
1974-78 8.22 1.60 9.46 1.84 12.05 2.34 5.15
B. Average Systematic Risk (Beta)
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
1.16 1.25
1.30 1.51
1.21 1.09
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In summary, all three measures indicated that the stocks in the bcttoir.
tiers were alvjays lODre volatile than stocks in the top tier. Both the
average percent range and standard deviation indicated that tier 3
experienced the largest increase in volatility- during the most recent
five year period. The beta results only indicated a significant change
over time for tier 2 versus the other tiers.
Dividend Payout Pvatio
It was hypothesized that initially small firms would have a lower
payout ratio than large firms and that the difference in payout would
increase over time because small firms would find it difficult to get
equity capital from the primarj' market and would be forced to reduce
their payout even more.
The results in Table 6 tend to support these eiipectat ions. The
average payout for top and middle tier firms were generally siiralar ynd
there was a difference between tier 1 and 3 but it was not significant.
The results over time likewise support the hypothesis because the stocks
in tier 3 e>:perienced the largest decline in payout but it was not
significant. Notably, the difference in the payout ratio was greater
at the end of the period than at the beginning but none of the time-tier
test^ were significant. It is also noteworthy that the tier one payout
gained relative to the S+P400 (.90 to .96); tier two declined slightly
(.87 to .85), and tier three declined the most (.72 to .67).
Debt-Equity Ratio
The results in Table 7 figures confirii; the secular increase in
financial leverage during the 15 year period—i.e., the average debt-equity
ratio for FTC firms fjjuost doubled from .23 to ,AA,
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Initially, all the tiers v^ere approxiniEtel}' equal at about .30,
Subsequently, the bottom tier companies increased theii debt-equity
ratio to about ,80, The results indicate that there were significant
differences between the tiers for the total period—both tier 1 and
tier 3 experienced significant increases in their debt-equity ratios.
Finally', the time-tier test indicated that tier 3 experienced a signif-
icantly larger increase than tier 2, Notable, the increase in the
debt-equity ratio for tier 3 was not significantly larger than tier 1
apparentlj' due to 1974. During the most recent five year period the
i
tier 3 ratio was in the 50-60 percent range except for 1974 (1.072)
compared to about 70-80 percent for tier 3. Also, while the relative
ratio for top tier firms declined from 1.36 to 1,13, the relative ratio
for bottom tier firms increased from 1.36 to 1.43 (and was even higher
during 1976 and 1977).
SUMMARY Aim CONCLUSION
Summary
This paper examined what happened during the period 1964-1978 to
firms in three tiers in tenns of market liquidity, stock price volatility,
dividend policy, and the debt-equity ratio.
The sample firms were randocly selected and placed into one of
three tiers on the basis of market value because this is probably the
major factor that determines what stocks institutions include in their
portfolios. The stocks had significant differences in size ranging
from about $4 billion for top tier companies to $100 million for bottom
tier firms.
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TABLE 6
A\TRAGE CIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO FOR COIIPAiaES
IN ALTERNATI\rE TIERS AND RELATI\T: TC
S+P400 PAYOUT
YEAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 S+P400
Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave. Rel. Ave.
1964 .461 .85 .438 .81 .360 .67 .54
1965 c451 o87 .418 .80 .347 .67 .52
1966 .446 .87 .438 .86 .358 .70 .51
1967 .480 .91 .481 .91 .386 .73 .53
1968 .491 .94 .484 .93 .407 .78 .52
1969 .549 1.04 .517 .98 .361 .68 .53
1970 .624 1.06 .645 1.09 .450 .76 .59
1971 .532 1.00 .552 1.04 .369 .70 .53
1972 c465 .95 .431 .88 .314 .64 .49
1973 .354 .91 .337 .86 .328 .84 .39
1974 .365 .96 .349 o92 .283 .75 .38
1975 .410 .93 .379 .86 .317 .72 ,44
1976 .374 .94 .334 .84 .247 .62 .40
1977 .413 .96 .375 .87 .244 .57 .43
1978 .410 1.00 .315 .77 .274 .67 .41
1964-•68 .466 .90 .452 .87 .372 .72 .52
1969-•73 .505 .99 .496 .97 .364 .71 .51
1974-78 .394 .96 .350 .85 .273 .67 .41
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE DEBT-EQUITY RATIOS FOR COMPANIES
IK ALTERNATIVE TIERS AND RELATHi: TO
ALL INDUSTRIAL. FTC FIRMS
YEAR Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 F
Ave. Rel. Ave, Rel. Ave, Rel. A-
1964 .318 1.36 .301 1.29 .317 1.36 ,2
1965 .328 1.26 .319 1.22 .392 1.50 .2
1966 .364 1.28 .378 1.33 .433 1.52 .2
1967 .368 1.16 .448 1.41 .461 1.45 ,3
1968 .515 1.46 ,452 1.28 .552 1.56 .3
1969 .514 1.37 .492 1.32 .588 1.57 .3
1970 .616 1.53 ,548 1.36 .712 1.77 .4
1971 .558 1.33 .519 1,24 .712 1.70 .4
1972 .559 1.34 .517 1,24 .635 1.52 .4
1973 .515 1,32 .510 1.30 .624 1.60 .3
1974 1.072 2.61 .519 1.26 .875 2.13 .4
1975 .662 1.54 .552 1.28 .728 1.69 .4
1976 .542 1.28 ,535 1.26 .836 1.98 .4
1977 .504 1.17 .516 1.19 .812 1.88 .4
1978 .496 1.13 .533 1.21 ,632 1.43 .4
1964-
1969-
1974-
68 .379
-73 .552
78 .655
1.31
1.38
1.53
,380
.517
.531
1.31
1.29
1.24
.431
.654
.777
1.47
1.63
1.82
t ^
.4
.4
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The market liquidity results indicated a significant difference in
shares traded to begin with, and the difference became significantly
larger during the period. Regarding trading turnover, the initial
value for lower tier stocks was higher, but during the period, while
top tier turnover increased, the turnover for bottom tier stocks de-
clined which confirms the deterioration of liquidity for these stocks.
The analysis of price volatility on the basis of the percent
range of annual prices indicated that stocks in the lower tiers defi-
nitely had a higher level of price volatility for the total period
and it increased more during the most recent period. The average
standard deviation indicated that the bottom tier stocks were more
volatile initially and the volatility increased more over time. The
average betas indicated that the lower tiers always had higher betas
but the changes over time were not significantly different.
The dividend payout ratios for bottom tier firms was lower
initially and declined more during the time period than top tier
firms but the difference was not statistically significant. The
debt-equity ratios were similar during the initial years, but the
lower tier finas increased their ratios by more than the top tier firms.
The difference between the top and bottom tiers was not significant but
this appeared to be due to a single year and the overall status appeared
to indicated a definite difference.
Conclusion
The purpose was to examine the changes that had transpired over
the recent 15 year period because of the growth of a tiered stock
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market. The results clearly document some major affects: although
almost all the changes were as hypothesized, not all of them were sta-
tistically significant. Clearly the lower tier firms have experienced
a decline in relative market liquidity and dividend payout, while
experiencing an increase in stock price volatility and financial leverage.
Almost all the changes are detrimental to the lower tier stocks
because these stocks have become riskier relative to top tier stocks.
TliC impact could cause further deterioration in the secondary markets
for these stocks which, in turn, will make it more difficult for them
to acquire new equity capital from the primary market.
-24-
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